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Abstract—Intentional and unintentional interfer-
ences collectively referred to as Radio Frequency In-
terference (RFI) result in severe security threat to the
public safety, first responder emergency rescue and mil-
itary missions. Such RFI if not detected and localized
can disrupt the wireless communication which forms
the backbone of first responder and military operations.
The prime objective of this work was to design and
prototype a RFI detection and localization device, Jam-
Guard that significantly outperforms traditional ap-
proaches in real-life deployment yet be computationally
feasible to be developed as a low SWaC (size, weight,
and cost) device. The proposed device employs a unique
combination of robust parallel detection algorithms
based on Kurtosis and FRactional Fourier Transform
(FRFT) with Golden Section Search algorithm to
rapidly detect RFI that affects critical communication
signals. The localization scheme is designed to leverage
the FRFT output from the detection phase to ease the
computational load. We give a detailed account of the
device prototyping and evaluation. To demonstrate the
efficacy of the proposed detection approach as opposed
to conventional energy detection (employed in several
commercial interference detectors), we compare the
two schemes on test and target platforms. The proposed
scheme depicted significant improvement (∼ 40 dB) in
detection probability both in preliminary implementa-
tion and target prototype experiments.
Index Terms—Signal detection, fractional Fourier
transform, jammer localization, kurtosis, efficient hard-
ware implementation
I. Introduction
The recent surge of cheap portable jammers and their
ease of availability to commoners from illicit online stores
poses a severe threat to national security. Most of these
jammers block the Global Positioning System (GPS),
Cellular, LoJack, WiFi, public safety and law enforcement
communication bands (disrupting 9-1-1 calls) and so on.
We will collectively refer to such intentional interferences
and unintentional emissions from faulty electronics as
radio frequency interference (RFI). Military as well as
civilians rely heavily on GPS and cellular bands for po-
sition, navigation and timing (PNT) data and wireless
communication. Military’s significant reliance on GPS for
PNT information also makes it a plausible target. For
example, during tactical missions, the Air Force Space
command might position the GPS satellites over the target
area for precise strikes. Similar missions would require
precise PNT information and undeterred communication
to prevent any civilian casualties. During such events,
detecting, localizing and mitigating any such jammers in
the vicinity is key to the mission’s success and to prevent
casualties.
There have been several such reports of illegal jammer
use interfering with airport ground-based augmentation
system (GBAS), maritime navigation, LoJack car security
systems, cell phones etc. One such incident is the interfer-
ence caused to the GBAS at the Newark Liberty Interna-
tional Airport in 2012 by the GPS jammer used by a New
Jersey truck driver [1]. The truck driver used the jammer
for personal privacy to prevent his employer from tracking
the company-operated truck’s whereabouts using the GPS
tracking system installed on the truck. Another similar
incident took place in France in 2017, after a 50-yr old
man left an activated GPS jammer in his car and forgot to
switch it off prior to boarding a flight from the Nantes Air-
port leading to severe communication disruption causing
delayed flights [2]. Several such jammer related incidents
are reported worldwide and are a significant risk to public
safety and a potential tool for terrorist activities. First
responders require seamless communication to effectively
carry out rescue missions and to communicate back to the
base to apprise them of the current situation and dispatch
officers to the site. Any communication disruption amidst
such rescue missions can be fatal to both the victims and
the first responders. Accordingly, the capability to identify
the cause of communication disruption and localizing the
source of RFI will be a significant step towards jammer
mitigation. Therefore, in this work, we will design and
prototype a low cost, portable device capable of detecting
and localizing RFI in an efficient manner. The portability
of the device is considered as a prime factor in our design
constraint to allow first responders to carry it around
with ease and install on the patrol vehicles. The low
cost is another notable characteristic to allow rapid and
affordable customer acquisition. This work significantly
expands upon our previous work [3] which included the
initial prototyping stages and preliminary results.
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II. Related Works
Signal detection and characterization is a well re-
searched topic [4], [5], [6], [7], [8], [9] through theoretical
approaches, simulations and few experimental analysis
[10], [11], [12], [13], [14]. A frame-based Fast Fourier Trans-
form (FFT) approach is proposed in [4] to detect chirp sig-
nal and to estimate its chirp rate. This approach estimates
the peak frequency (frequency bin with the maximum
magnitude) across consecutive FFT frames and uses the
peak frequency difference to estimate chirp rate and as the
indicator to chirp signal presence. The algorithm is imple-
mented and verified by simulations and by measured data.
An overlapped FFT based energy detection technique is
mentioned in [5]. The authors propose window functions
that reduces the correlation between adjacent FFT frames
and numerically validate that the window function ob-
tained by upsampling Hamming window improves the
detection performance. All of these works were evaluated
by simulations. A framework for automatic modulation
classification (FACT) is proposed and validated in [10]
which performs a conventional energy detection followed
by modulation classification. The effectiveness of FACT
was validated on a five USRP testbed. Since their focus
was to propose a framework for signal detection and clas-
sification, the authors only considered narrowband signals
and use a traditional FFT based energy detector for signal
detection. [11] propose a FFT and kurtosis based approach
to detect signal presence whereby the kurtosis of FFT of
the signal forms the test statistic. Authors implemented
the proposed approach on software defined radio (SDR)
using LabView. Furthermore, most commercial RFI de-
tectors like CTL3520, CTL3510 predominantly depend on
conventional energy detector to identify the presence of
RFI. CTL3520 and CTL3510 are the commercial outcomes
of the UK based SENTINEL project [12]. The SENTINEL
system adopts a signal-to-noise-ratio (SNR) and FFT-
based algorithm to perform RFI detection. The main
shortcoming of FFT-based approaches discussed above is
its poor performance at low SNR. In these cases, other
characteristics of the signal has to be extracted to ensure
high probability of detection.
Accordingly, the authors propose a joint signal signal
detection and classification approach in [8]. The authors
adopt a cyclostationary approach to determine the spec-
tral coherence density of the signals to detect followed by
a Hidden Markov Model to classify them. Such cyclosta-
tionary technique can be very effective at lower SNRs but
incurs high computational complexity and requires larger
samples to accurately detect and classify. These computa-
tional and processing constraints necessitate the need for
faster expensive processors and would be harder to extend
to low cost, portable platforms. Unlike the cyclostationary
approaches, we focus on FRactional Fourier Transform
(FRFT) which is implemented to be computationally
efficient while providing accurate detection with fewer
samples as will be explained in the upcoming sections.
In [6], an FRFT based approach to detect sonar echoes
of a desired chirp signal of interest from cluttered back-
ground is introduced. The FRFT at the matched order
of the desired chirp would appear as a tone. Everywhere
except the tone is notched out to suppress the noise
from the received signal samples. The authors verified
the algorithmic correctness of proposed approach by sim-
ulations. Similarly, the authors propose to use FRFT in
conjunction with kurtosis to detect chirp signals in [7].
In this case, the kurtosis is performed on the FRFT
transformed signal representation. FRFT concentrates the
energy of chirp signal while kurtosis can identify the
peak energy concentration to detect the chirp signal. The
authors propose to use FRFT filtering to filter out the
detected component and repeat the detection process to
iteratively detect multiple chirp components in the signal.
The authors demonstrate the effectiveness of proposed
approach by simulations. They adopt a threshold approach
to detect the signal from white Gaussian noise (WGN)
such that any signal with a kurtosis greater than zero will
be considered a positive detection. However, in practical
scenarios, the Gaussian distribution do not adequately
model the underlying noise contributed by the receiver,
surroundings etc [15], [16]. Consequently, the kurtosis
of signal deficient captures (noise) are non-zero values.
Thus, an empirical approach is necessary to model the
threshold to prevent false detections. Additionally, authors
vaguely mention the matching order of FRFT is found
by a one dimensional search procedure and do not reveal
further information on the search. In a realistic unknown
hostile jamming environment, FRFT matched orders of
the jammers are unknown and the search procedure chosen
to acquire the matching order is crucial to a successful
detection and computational load. Furthermore, in this
work, we also explore how the output from FRFT can be
further exploited to perform localization of the RFI.
Deploying algorithms on hardware platforms for com-
mercial use is significantly challenging and requires careful
consideration of several factors viz. robust performance,
computational complexity, ease of use, relevant features of
the prototype and meeting size-weight-and cost (SWaC)
constraints. There is a lack of comprehensive detection and
analysis technique designed, and developed specifically for
first responders to tackle intentional chirp signal that
sweeps through a wide band and narrow band signal
generated by unintentional RFI sources. Most approaches
that solely rely on RFI signal energy deteriorate in low
SNR scenarios. In this work, we propose a low cost,
portable device, Jam-Guard, that performs robust RFI
detection and localization designed specifically for Group-
I, Group-II and Group-III jammers [3], [17]. The utility of
a RFI detector lies in its ability to detect very low power
signals with exceptionally low false alarm rates. This
requires adoption of a robust parallel detection module
consisting of statistical techniques such as Kurtosis and
time-frequency technique such as FRFT. To ensure lower
complexity while ensuring high probability of detection,
we adeptly employ Golden Section Search (GSS) [18] to
efficiently converge at the FRFT matched order. Addition-
ally, we adopt an FRFT based approach to localize using
MUSIC [19]. The matched order FRFT computed during
detection is reused to prevent recomputation and save
computational resources. Proposed detection outperforms
the state-of-the-art commercial RFI detectors.
Therefore, the contribution of this paper can be sum-
marized as follows,
• To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work
that proposes a comprehensive RFI detection and
localization device while maintaining a low SWaC
footprint.
• The FRFT-based parallel signal detection scheme
is designed and preliminary feasibility is established
using extensive experiments using SDRs.
• Output of FRFT-based detection scheme to perform
localization has been established using simulations.
• Most importantly, Jam-Guard prototype is developed
using Commercial Off-The-Shelf (COTS) components
and the proposed algorithm is implemented and re-
fined to establish a Pareto efficiency between compu-
tation load and accuracy of detection.
III. System Architecture
The overall system architecture of Jam-Guard is shown
in Fig. 1. Each Jam-Guard consists of two parallel de-
tection paths, (i) Coarse kurtosis based detector and (ii)
Fine FRFT based detector. Each individual Jam-Guard
also performs a preliminary analysis of the detected RFI
and saves this information as a detection report locally.
This information is reused during localization to prevent
recomputing.
A. Coarse Detector
The coarse detection module performs kurtosis detec-
tion by considering the fourth and second moments of
the frequency domain samples of the captured samples.
Kurtosis is computed on the Fourier transform of the
received Inphase-Quadrature (IQ) samples as follows,
K =
1
N
∑N
n=1(R(n)− R¯)4
( 1N
∑N
n=1(R(n)− R¯)2)2
(1)
where N is the number of IQ samples that are processed,
R(n) denotes the absolute value of N-point FFT of the
received samples and R¯ is the average FFT magnitude.
B. Fine Detector
Fine detector houses an FRFT-order search procedure
(GSS) to lock on to the matching FRFT order. RFI is
detected if the matched order corresponding to a peak
in the FRFT domain is obtained. To identify the peak
efficiently, we compute kurtosis of the absolute value of
FRFT. FRFT can give higher energy concentration of
chirp signals in the FRFT domain once the transform
order matches the chirp rate of the RFI. The GSS [18] in
a closed interval searches for the order corresponding to
the maximum FRFT value. The FRFT of the IQ samples
are evaluated as per the digital computation proposed by
Ozatkas et al. [20].
Fa[f(x)] = Aαejpiγx
2
∫ ∞
−∞
ej2piβxx
′
[ejpiγx
′2
f(x′)]dx′, (2)
where α = api2 is the transform angle, γ = cotα, β =
cscα and f(x) is the function that is being transformed.
The discrete form of the transform requiring O(N logN)
computations is expressed as
Fa[f( m2∆x )] =
Aα
2∆xe
jpi(γ−β)(m/2∆x)2× (3)
N∑
n=−N
ejpiβ((m−n)/2∆x)
2
ejpi(γ−β)(n/2∆x)
2
f( n2∆x ),
This expression can be realized with simpler operations
such as chirp multiplication and convolution. The con-
volution can be performed in O(N logN) time by using
FFT keeping the overall complexity at O(N logN). The
computations are as per the detailed FRFT computation
in [21]. The time-frequency (x − ν) plane of a signal can
be viewed in the FRFT domain as the rotation of the
x − ν axes around the origin making an angle α with
the x-axis. Readers are encouraged to read the work by
Ozatkas et al. [20] and A. Bultheel et al. [21] to gain more
insight into the FRFT computation. The detection module
logs the FRFT at the matched order, peak FRFT value,
matched FRFT order, frequency bin corresponding to the
peak FRFT value in the detection report.
C. Localization-MUSIC
In this section, we discuss how we leverage the matched
order FRFT derived at detection phase to perform local-
ization. We localize the wideband RFI source by modifying
the Multiple Signal Classification (MUSIC) algorithm to
obtain the direction of arrival (DoA). We consider a far
field wideband Linear Frequency Modulated (LFM) chirp
signal impinging a linear array of M Jam-Guards on the
(x, y) plane with a direction of arrival (θ). The discrete
N−point chirp signal as received by the ith Jam-Guard is
expressed as
ri(t) = s(t)νi(θ) + ni(t) (4)
where ni(t) is the additive white Gaussian noise, s(t) =
e[j2pi(ft+
µ
2 t
2)] is the chirp signal with initial frequency f
and chirp rate µ, νi(θ) = e
−j(i−1)2pid sin θ
λ is the steering
function of the i − th Jam-Guard. The wideband signal
is focused into a single frequency component by means of
matched FRFT order (aopt). This is attributed to the de-
chirping effect of FRFT [22]. The matched-order FRFT
can be expressed as,
rˆi(t) = Faopt [ri(t)] (5)
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Fig. 1. System Diagram of Proposed Device
Rewriting the equation (4) in matrix form, we have
R = Θs(t) + N (6)
where R = [rˆ1(t), rˆ2(t), ..., rˆM (t)]T is the array output
data, Θ = [1, e−j2pid sin θλ , ..., e
−j(M−1)2pid sin θ
λ ], and N is the
additive white Gaussian noise. Since saving computational
resources is prominent for any real-time system perfor-
mance, we reuse the matched order FRFT (Faopt [ri(t)])
computed during the detection phase. The gist of MUSIC
lies in decomposing the array output covariance matrix
into signal and noise subspaces to form a spatial spec-
trum function. The array output covariance matrix can
be obtained by sample-averaging the array output data
as Rcov = (1/N)RRH . Eigen decomposing the array
output covariance matrix separates it into signal and noise
subspaces. After arranging the eigenvalue-eigen vectors in
the descending order, the first column corresponds to the
signal subspace while the remaining (M−1) corresponds to
noise subspace (Rn). To account for low SNR scenarios, an
improved-MUSIC [23] is considered which performs spatial
smoothing of Rcov such that Rc = Rcov+TR∗covT, where
T = f[I(M)] is the transition matrix and ∗ is the complex
conjugate. Here, the function f[X] flips the columns of
matrix X from left to right and I(M) creates an identity
matrix of size M with ones on its main diagonal and zeros
elsewhere. Thus, new noise subspace Rcn is computed
for the transitioned covariance matrix Rc. The spatial
spectrum function takes the form,
M(θ) = 1ΘHRcnRHcnΘ
(7)
A one-dimensional search for the direction of arrivals
(azimuths) along the direction of maximum spatial spec-
trum will return the true azimuth.
IV. Preliminary Feasibility Analysis
The preliminary goal of this work was to conduct a
rapid feasibility analysis of the proposed detector frame-
work in terms probability of detection (Pd) under var-
ious operating scenarios. In this regard, we have used
Universal Software Radio Peripheral (USRP), a software
defined radio, to generate few generic RFI waveforms to
be transmitted in the industrial, scientific and medical
(ISM) radio bands to emulate the behaviors of jammers
for the purpose of OTA evaluation. The waveforms were
developed on GNU Radio platform (open-source signal
processing software). The signal processing for generating
the waveforms was written in Python and imported into
GNURadio. An AirSpy mini SDR [24] connected to the
host laptop was acting as the receiver. AirSpy mini can be
programmed with the libairspy application programming
interface. The detection algorithms were run on a Linux
laptop with Intel i5-4670 processor.
To evaluate the performance of the detector (imple-
mented in C++) under varying SNR, we applied digital
scaling factor to the generated RFI. The varying RFI
amplitudes are represented as varying scaling factor using
a dB scale. In order to visualize the operating conditions,
three power spectrum plots of the RFI received at different
scaling factors are shown in Fig. 2. The green color depicts
the peak hold function at each frequency, whereas the
blue color shows the instantaneous signal energy. It is
important to realize that the instantaneous SNR is lower
than the impression that the peak hold plot provides.
The RFI generated is a Group-II LFM chirp waveform
sweeping at a rate of 2 MHz/s. The AirSpy mini (SDR)
is tuned to listen to 6 MHz bandwidth with center
frequency at 917 MHz. The performance is evaluated
for three detectors, (i) conventional energy detector, (ii)
proposed detector with coarse search and (iii) proposed
detector with fine search. The coarse search performs a
Fig. 2. SNR at different Jammer Scaling level
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Fig. 3. Probability of Detection vs Signal Strength
simple three order search at predetermined FRFT orders
[0.2, 0.3, 0.4] and used mean FRFT magnitude as the test
statistic. The fine search employed the GSS algorithm with
convergence rate 10−8 to determine the matched order
and uses kurtosis of FRFT as mentioned in subsection
III-B. For each of these detectors, we evaluate threshold set
accordingly for two false alarm rates Pfa = [10−8, 10−10].
Each data point in Fig. 3 corresponds to an average of
1095 spectral snapshots with receiver sampling at a rate
of 3 MS/s. At each snapshot, the detector processes 4096
IQ samples. At very low SNR scenario (i.e. when Jammer
scaling factor was set to −60 dB ), the proposed solution
with GSS renders a significant improvement as opposed
to coarse search. The proposed detector with fine search
starts to provide near absolute detection even at low SNR
conditions which further saturates with increasing RFI
power. Both versions of the proposed detector outperforms
conventional energy detector which delivers acceptable
detection rates only when the RFI power is high enough
(i.e. when Jammer scaling factor was set to −20 dB to
−10 dB). Therefore, our preliminary analysis has shown
that the proposed device will significantly outperform (by
up to 40 dB) devices that depend on conventional energy
detector at a given Pfa.
Further, to test the performance of the improved-
MUSIC approach, we perform computer simulations in
MATLAB. For the test scenario, we consider a LFM
source incident at an azimuth of 20o upon two Jam-Guards
located on a first responder vehicle at a distance d = λ/2
apart. To study the effect of varying RFI power, we vary
the SNR of incident LFM from 0 to 20 dB in steps of 2
dB. Figure 4 plots the absolute azimuth estimation error
for varying SNR. The azimuth estimation error degrades
with increasing SNR.
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Fig. 4. Absolute Azimuth estimation error vs Signal Strength
The algorithmic effectiveness of the proposed detection
scheme was successfully established from these preliminary
tests. Bear in mind, these were run on an Intel i5 processor.
The same tests would be slower on any low cost embedded
platform. Once of the key challenges of this work is to
develop superior RFI detection framework on the embed-
ded platform owing to the SWaC constraints. In the next
section, we will conduct an extensive complexity analysis
which forms the backbone of the Jam-Guard prototype
development.
V. Prototype Development and Evaluation
In our design, the main development board is a Rasp-
berry Pi (RPI) 3 Model B with Quad Core Broadcom
BCM2837 64-bit ARMv8 processor and weighing 41.2 g.
The choice was motivated from the low cost, size and
large open community support for RPI development. Ad-
ditionally, it is enabled with WiFi (802.11 b/g/n). To
reside within the SWaC constraints of the device, Jam-
Guard uses AirSpy mini which is compatible with RPI
and weighs 50 g. The technical specifications include 3.5
dB NF between 42 and 1002 MHz, 12 bit ADC at 20 MSPS
and 10, 6 and 3 MSPS IQ output.
To generate three types of feedback, Jam-Guard possess;
(i) Mini LCD screen: provide visual feedback by displaying
basic information of the detected RFI, (ii) Audio buzzer:
beeps to indicate the detection of RFI in the given channel
and (iii) Haptic motor controller: provide haptic feedback
to the end users. Jam-Guard further includes Perma-
Proto HAT, Ultimate GPS HAT, Stacking Header, 3.7V
Lithium Ion battery pack, a nine degree of freedom inertial
Fig. 5. Component layout of Jam-Guard
measurement unit (IMU) sensor (3-axis accelerometer, 3-
axis magnetometer and a 3-axis gyroscope) to estimate
location when GPS is temporarily unavailable, and three
3-pin switches. The demystified layout and the complete
prototype of Jam-Guard are shown in Fig. 5 and Fig. 6
respectively.
Fig. 6. Jam-Guard
1) Complexity Analysis: The algorithmic feasibility was
established in the previous section. To achieve real-time
performance from Jam-Guard, it is imperative to establish
computational feasibility on the target embedded plat-
form. In order to emphasize the significance of minimizing
the CPU load or in other words to hasten the detection
process, in this section, we will discuss the computational
complexity of adopting proposed solution and how the
current prototype of Jam-Guard ensures rapid detection.
In its early phases of development, Jam-Guard utilized
an iterative search procedure which would search for the
matching FRFT order in a closed interval [0.001, 1.51]
that yielded a detection probability of 0.947. But this
approach was impractical for a real-time detection for first
responders as it was rather slower and required 120× 108
CPU cycles to complete which would imply more than
an hour to detect on an intel i5 processor. The need for
a faster search procedure formed the motivation behind
adopting GSS. The GSS approach with a convergence rate
of 10−8 and 10−3 drastically reduced the CPU cycles to
30×108 and 10×108 respectively while yielding a detection
probability of 0.9973. This implied an execution time in
the order of several seconds on the RPI platform which
where impractical and required to be further reduced to
deliver real-time performance. To further speed up the
detection, the FRFT computation had to be sped up such
that all factors contributing to the detection time are
covered.
Subsequently, a faster implementation of FRFT was
adopted. The faster approach followed a two-phase im-
plementation as opposed to the single-phase approach by
[21]. The two-phase approach splits the samples into even
and odd parts and performs all operations on each of
them separately such that only the necessary samples
are computed [25]. We followed this two-phase approach
along with the GSS of convergence rate 10−3 to arrive
at a reduced CPU cycles of 5 × 108 with a detection
probability of 0.9973. This implied a faster detection time
of ≤ 1 s on RPI platform. The complexity reduction is
summarized in table I. The higher detection probability as
opposed to iterative search can be attributed to the finer
FRFT order resolution of the GSS realized by the Golden
ratio. The resolution of iterative search is 0.01 which is
very coarse compared to GSS. Reducing the step size of
iterative search will only increase the detection time and
hence not ideal for the application at hand.
TABLE I
Complexity Analysis of Jam-Guard Detection Schemes
Jam-Guard Detection
Schemes
CPU Cy-
cles
Pd
Iterative Search [0.001, 1.51]. 120× 108 0.947
GSS convergence rate 10−8 30× 108 0.9973
GSS convergence rate 10−3 17× 108 0.9973
GSS (10−3) with Two-phase
FRFT
6× 108 0.9973
2) Prototype Performance Analysis: The entire detec-
tion is implemented on the RPI platform in C++. The
detection algorithm hosts two boost threads to acquire the
samples from AirSpy mini receiver and process them for
detection. The coarse and fine detection processes run in
parallel and trigger the GPIO pins of the RPI to trigger the
alerts upon RFI detection. A pipe is employed to perform
sanity checks between the two parallel processes.
In order to illustrate the effectiveness of Jam-Guard
compared to conventional Energy detectors on the embed-
ded platform, we perform real-time testing of the detection
algorithm running on Jam-Guard under three settings;
single-phase FRFT with GSS convergence 10−3 (green
curve), two-phase FRFT with GSS convergence 10−3 (blue
curve), and conventional energy detection (red curve).
Jam-Guard receives the samples at a sampling rate of
3 MS/s and captures a 0.34 ms snapshot at a center
frequency of 917 MHz. The RFI settings are the same as
in the preliminary testing. The receiver operating charac-
teristics (ROC) curve of Jam-Guard once again showcases
superior detection capability as opposed to conventional
Energy detectors as shown in Fig. 7. The two-phase FRFT
curve performs as good as the single-phase FRFT while
achieving CPU performance gain of ∼ 66%. A notable
feature of using FRFT as opposed to other cyclostationary
approaches is the ability to detect with very few samples
(1024 samples) which significantly saves the CPU load.
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VI. Conclusion and Future Work
This work showcased a detailed account of the devel-
opment cycle and evaluations of Jam-Guard that signifi-
cantly outperforms the state-of-the-art devices in market.
We have presented a detailed implementation analysis of
Jam-Guard, hardware details, and presented the in-depth
preliminary and embedded platform experimental results.
The low SWaC of the proposed device will enable first
responders and other users to carry it with ease during
their mission. Jam-Guard is equipped with three types of
alerts; audio, visual and haptic to alert the users of the
detected RFI thereby improving efficiency and safety. The
future work involves developing a dual antenna version of
Jam-Guard, virtual array techniques to localize more than
one RFI source, and two-dimensional DoA estimation such
that the azimuth and elevation of the RFI source can be
deduced by a single Jam-Guard.
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